Democracy Reporting International is a Berlin-registered nonprofit founded in 2006 to bolster electoral law and constitutional design abroad. Since 2019 its center of gravity has shifted to a Digital Democracy program that claims to map and counter online manipulation. Flagship projects include Disinfo Radar, an interactive series on synthetic media and other emerging “tool-kits of deception,” financed by the German Federal Foreign Office. A companion site, the Digital Democracy Monitor, offers open-source toolkits and a Knowledge Hub tracking EU regulation; these resources were built with grants from Civitates and Stiftung Mercator. DRI’s annual report for 2023 lists total revenues of €6.68 million, of which €3.16 million came from the German Foreign Office. The same year the organization joined the revamped EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, filing its first transparency report shortly thereafter, in September 2024. Earlier election-risk studies, such as a Reset-funded audit of the 2021 Bundestag campaign, extend the group’s methodology from German to EU campaigns.
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Democracy Reporting International (DRI)
Germany's Federal Foreign Office (AA), Stiftung Mercator, Civitates, European Cultural...See all
Germany's Federal Foreign Office (AA), Stiftung Mercator, Civitates, European Cultural Foundation, Reset Tech See less
Disinfo Radar, Digital Democracy Monitor, Assessment of Online Risks for the 2021 German Federal Elections
Disinfo Radar, Upgrade Democracy, Tagesspiegel Innovation Lab...See all
Disinfo Radar, Upgrade Democracy, Tagesspiegel Innovation Lab See less
Commentary:
DRI is another group that pivoted to battling disinformation on social media "following the controversial US elections and UK Brexit referendum." Their risk assessment offers a brisk taxonomy of digital threats surrounding elections. Online ads are treated chiefly as vectors for opacity, hate speech as evidence of platform failure, foreign actors as latent saboteurs. In a report on the 2021 Bundestag vote, each section ends with calls for tighter disclosure rules, expanded removal windows and new oversight mandates – recommendations that echo EU proposals already in circulation. The report’s method relies on expert interviews rather than fresh data, yielding a policy wish‑list more than an empirical audit. With funding from Reset, a London‑based philanthropy active in campaigns for stricter platform oversight, this paper sits comfortably within a transatlantic consensus seeing popular mistrust in reigning institutions and politicians as stemming from insufficient moderation rather than substantive political alienation from the centrist parties. Its premise – that "online risks" can be neutralized by procedural fixes – leaves little room for examining how mainstream parties and institutions themselves exploit micro‑targeting, or how media concentration shapes public debate. DRI maps the dangers yet prescribes technocratic hygiene in place of greater democratic participation.
DRI is another group that pivoted to battling disinformation on social media "following the controversial US elections and UK Brexit referendum." Their risk assessment offers a brisk taxonomy of digital threats surrounding elections. Online ads are treated chiefly as vectors for opacity, hate speech as evidence of platform failure, foreign actors as latent saboteurs. In a report on the 2021 Bundestag vote, each section ends with calls for tighter disclosure rules, expanded removal windows and new oversight mandates – recommendations that echo EU proposals already in circulation. The report’s method relies on expert interviews rather than fresh data, yielding a policy wish‑list more than an empirical audit. With funding from Reset, a London‑based philanthropy active in campaigns for stricter platform oversight, this paper sits comfortably within a transatlantic consensus seeing popular mistrust in reigning institutions and politicians as stemming from insufficient moderation rather than substantive political alienation from the centrist parties. Its premise – that "online risks" can be neutralized by procedural fixes – leaves little room for examining how mainstream parties and institutions themselves exploit micro‑targeting, or how media concentration shapes public debate. DRI maps the dangers yet prescribes technocratic hygiene in place of greater democratic participation.